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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Amici are law professors who teach and write 
in the field of federal jurisdiction.1  William Araiza is 
Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law 
School. Howard M. Wasserman is Professor of Law at 
Florida International University College of Law. 
Lawrence Sager holds the Alice Jane Drysdale 
Sheffield Regents Chair at the University of Texas 
School of Law. Stephen I. Vladeck is Professor of Law 
at American University’s Washington College of 
Law. Ernest A. Young is the Alston & Bird Professor 
at Duke Law School. 
For decades, this Court’s decision in United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), has 
stood as a central affirmation of judicial 
independence; its precise holding, however, has been 
the focus of considerable speculation and 
disagreement. Amici believe that, while 
disagreement persists among scholars about the 
scope and theoretical underpinnings of Klein, there is 
also widespread agreement about certain core 
principles. This brief attempts to articulate those 
principles and bring them to bear on the present 
case. 
                                            
1 This brief has been filed with the written consent of the 
parties, which filed blanket consents with the Clerk of Court. 
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici affirms that no counsel 
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any 
person or entity, other than amici or their counsel, make a 
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief. 
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STATEMENT 
The statute at issue in this case embodies an 
appealing policy choice. Respondents here represent 
victims of state-sponsored terrorism who have 
obtained default judgments against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Under existing rules of law, Iran 
possesses no assets within the United States that 
Respondents may reach to satisfy those judgments. 
Nonetheless, Respondents brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, attempting to reach almost $2 billion in 
assets held, through a series of intermediaries, by 
Petitioner, the National Bank of Iran. Respondents’ 
prospects in that suit were bleak until Congress 
intervened through a special provision of the Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 502, 126 Stat. 1214, 
1258, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8772, that required the 
district court to permit Respondents to reach the 
assets in question.  
Amici have little sympathy for the plight in 
which Petitioner finds itself, and we readily agree 
with Congress that Respondents’ claims cry out for 
compensation. But by telling a federal court how to 
decide a single case, and explicitly specifying that its 
directive would have no effect on any other parties, 
assets, or controversies no matter how similarly 
situated, Congress offended two bedrock principles of 
judicial independence. First, as this Court held in 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), 
Congress may not direct the resolution of a pending 
case in an Article III court without amending the 
underlying law. And second, even when Congress 
does enact new law, it must act generally and not 
with respect to a single case. When Congress 
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disregards these principles, as it did in the wake of 
the Civil War, it will often have an appealing case on 
policy grounds and the parties on the receiving end 
will often be unattractive. But the core notion of 
constitutionalism is that we insist on observing 
constitutional limitations even when the equities of 
the particular case push most strongly in the other 
direction. 
Like other separation of powers problems, 
threats to judicial independence often come before 
this Court “clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing.” 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). Congress may limit federal 
jurisdiction in certain cases, assign a limited class of 
claims to non-judicial actors, or play with standards 
of review. But here, Congress has taken a single case 
and told the courts how to decide it—a core violation 
of our most fundamental commitment to judicial 
independence and integrity. As Justice Scalia has 
said in another context, “this wolf comes as a wolf.” 
Id. 
ARGUMENT 
 Section 8772 violates two closely related 
principles vital to the separation of powers. First, 
Congress may not direct the result in a pending case 
without amending the underlying law. And second, 
even if it does amend the underlying law, Congress 
may not do so in a way that applies only to a single 
case. Whatever else the separation of powers may 
require when Congress acts in a way that impacts 
pending litigation, judicial independence surely 
demands this much. And it is difficult to imagine a 
statute that would violate these principles more 
blatantly than the one at issue in this case. 
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I. Section 8772 violates the principle that 
Congress may not direct the result in a 
pending case without amending the 
underlying law. 
 This Court’s decision in United States v. Klein, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), has long been one of 
the most mysterious and fascinating cases in the 
Federal Courts canon. Scholars have offered a wide 
range of diverse and often conflicting interpretations 
of its meaning. But there has generally been a core of 
widespread agreement that, whatever else Klein’s 
language and holding may entail, it stands at a 
minimum for the proposition that Congress may not 
direct the result in a pending case without amending 
the underlying law.2 This principle is generally taken 
to be quite narrow, given that Congress may amend 
the law in ways that foreseeably affect pending 
litigation. But the general idea that Congress may 
not tell a court how to apply the existing law—much 
less instruct a court to disregard that law—is 
foundational to judicial independence and the rule of 
law. And this case plainly violates it. 
                                            
2 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters: 
Congressional Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J. Nat’l 
Sec. L. & Pol’y 251, 252–53 (2011); Howard W. Wasserman, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 53, 69-70 (2011); 
Evan H. Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 Const. Comment. 
529, 533 (2005); William D. Araiza, The Trouble with 
Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers, and the 
Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory 
Interpretation, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1055, 1079, 1088 (1999); 
Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: 
Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 697, 
718-21 (1995). 
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A. United States v. Klein is best 
understood to forbid Congress from 
directing the result in a pending 
case without amending the 
underlying law. 
During the Civil War, Congress enacted the 
Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 
820 (1863), which provided an opportunity for 
persons whose property was seized in the rebellious 
states to obtain the proceeds from sale of that 
property if they could prove that they had not “given 
any aid and comfort” to the rebellion. Shortly 
thereafter, President Abraham Lincoln issued a 
presidential proclamation offering a full pardon—
including restoration of rights in seized property—to 
persons who had been engaged in the rebellion if 
they took a new loyalty oath. Some years later, in 
United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 
(1870), this Court held that a person taking such an 
oath and receiving a pardon would be deemed legally 
loyal, and therefore entitled to restoration of 
property under the Abandoned and Captured 
Property Act. The Reconstruction Congress, 
generally skeptical toward President Andrew 
Johnson’s conciliatory policy toward the conquered 
South, responded by enacting a statute barring the 
use of a pardon to prove loyalty, taking a pardon to 
be conclusive proof that the claimant had been 
disloyal in fact, and requiring the federal courts to 
dismiss claims predicated on a pardon for want of 
jurisdiction.3 
                                            
3 See generally Wasserman, supra note 2, at 59-63; Amanda L. 
Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to 
Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in Federal Courts 
Stories 106 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009). 
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 This Court struck down that statute in Klein. 
The Court held that Congress’s action was not a 
valid “exercise of the acknowledged power of 
Congress to make exceptions and prescribe 
regulations to the appellate power” of the Supreme 
Court.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. Even though 
Congress may have broad power to restrict federal 
judicial jurisdiction,4 Chief Justice Chase wrote that 
Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the 
Judicial Department . . . in cases pending before it.” 
Id. Under the statute, “the court is forbidden to give 
the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, 
such evidence should have, and is directed to give it 
an effect precisely opposite.” Id. at 147. By so 
requiring, “Congress has inadvertently passed the 
limit which separates the legislative from the judicial 
power.” Id. Finally, the Court also suggested that by 
impairing the effect of a presidential pardon, the law 
“infring[ed] the constitutional power of the 
Executive.” Id.5 
                                            
4 The Court had decided Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
506 (1869), only two years previously. 
5 Id.  It may be tempting to read Klein simply as a case about 
the pardon power, holding that that Congress may not impair 
the full effect of a presidential pardon any more than it may 
restrict the President’s other exclusive powers. See, e.g., 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that 
Congress may not impair the President’s exclusive power to 
recognize foreign nations). But Chief Justice Chase plainly 
raised the pardon issue in the alternative: Having found that 
the statute “passed the limit which separates the legislative 
from the judicial power,” he observed that “[t]he rule prescribed 
is also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a 
pardon.” Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147; see also Caminker, 
supra note 2, at 533 (observing that “the structure and 
language of the Court’s opinion make clear that the two 
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 Klein’s language about “prescrib[ing] rules of 
decision” must be read, however, in conjunction with 
numerous decisions holding that Congress may 
amend the law governing pending litigation, and that 
courts must ordinarily give such amendments 
retroactive effect if Congress so intends.6 Klein itself 
recognized as much by distinguishing Pennsylvania 
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
421 (1855). In May of 1852, the Court had held that 
the Wheeling Bridge was an impediment to 
navigation and ordered it removed. In August of the 
same year, however, Congress passed an act 
declaring that the bridge (as well as another bridge 
in Ohio) was a lawful structure and designating both 
as federal post roads. In the wake of this new 
statute, the Court acknowledged that its prior decree 
could no longer be executed, and it rejected any 
argument that the new law interfered with the 
judicial power. See id. at 431–32, 435–36.7 The Klein 
                                                                                          
separation of powers principles discussed in Klein operate in 
the disjunctive”).   
6 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 
(1994); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
212 (1995) (“When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, 
an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments 
still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, 
and must alter the outcome accordingly.”). 
7 As Petitioners rightly note, see Petitioner’s Brief at 36–37, the 
Wheeling Bridge Court also emphasized that Congress’s statute 
altered only the Court’s prospective decree directing removal of 
the bridge. The Court suggested that the case would have come 
out differently had there been a claim for damages, Wheeling 
Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431, and in fact the Court did 
enforce the portion of its initial decree requiring the defendants 
to pay costs, id. at 436. But we think the critical aspect of 
Wheeling Bridge was that Congress had permanently, and for 
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Court found this decision perfectly consistent with its 
own holding. “No arbitrary rule of decision was 
prescribed in that case,” Chief Justice Chase wrote, 
“but the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to 
the new circumstances created by the act.” Klein, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47. In Klein itself, by contrast, 
“no new circumstances have been created by 
legislation.” Id. at 147. 
 This Court’s most recent interpretation of 
Klein shows the narrowness of Klein’s core principle, 
when read in conjunction with Congress’s 
acknowledged power to change the underlying law. 
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 
429 (1992), the Court considered the validity of the 
Northwest Timber Compromise, a federal statute 
modifying timber harvesting restrictions in forests 
home to the endangered spotted owl. The statute was 
enacted in response to ongoing litigation challenging 
whether the Bureau of Land Management had 
adequately considered the impact of permitted 
logging on the owl. As part of a compromise 
restricting logging in some areas and permitting it in 
others, § 318 of the statute designated particular 
portions of federal land, including that concerned in 
the ongoing litigation, as open to timber sales, and it 
mandated that management of the land pursuant to 
the law’s new provisions would be “adequate 
consideration for the purpose of meeting the 
statutory requirements that are the basis for” the 
ongoing litigation, which it referred to by name and 
docket number. See id. at 433–34. 
                                                                                          
all legal purposes, altered the underlying legal status of the 
bridge. 
9 
 
 The Ninth Circuit held that § 318 violated 
Klein because it directed the resolution of a pending 
case without amending the underlying law, but this 
Court reversed. Assuming that the court of appeals’ 
reading of Klein had been correct, the Court 
nonetheless found that the statute “compelled 
changes in law, not findings or results under old 
law.” Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438. That conclusion, on 
Robertson’s facts, seems perfectly in line with Klein’s 
distinction of the Wheeling Bridge case: Congress’s 
intervention exempted the specific provisions of the 
timber compromise from the general requirement 
that agencies consider environmental impacts; after 
all, Congress itself had considered those impacts in 
formulating the compromise. And although the 
compromise had the effect of eliminating the legal 
basis for the plaintiffs’ suit, the statute changed the 
law governing not just that suit but any other 
challenge to the timber sales affected by the 
compromise. Hence, “[t]o the extent that [the statute] 
affected the adjudication of the [pending] cases, it did 
so by effectively modifying the provisions at issue in 
those cases.” Id. at 440. 
 Although Robertson maintained Klein’s central 
distinction between directing law application and 
amending the underlying law, it illustrates that 
Congress may still achieve quite specific results 
when doing the latter, and those results may 
profoundly affect pending litigation. Critically, 
Robertson concerned the management of federal 
land, an exercise not of Congress’s general Article I 
legislative powers but rather its Article IV power “to 
dispose of . . . property belonging to the United 
States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. Decisions about the 
disposition of federal assets and resources are 
10 
 
necessarily more targeted than general legislation, 
and it may be that Congress should be held to a 
stricter standard when it exercises its general 
legislative powers.8 But in any event, Congress’s 
observance of the distinction between directing 
application and amending law maintains important 
separation of powers values. 
B. Precluding Congress from directing 
results without changing the law 
serves important separation of 
powers values. 
 This Court’s decision in Robertson did not 
expressly adopt the view that Klein’s prohibition 
turns on the difference between directing the 
outcome of a case and amending the underlying law; 
it assumed that the court of appeals had been correct 
in so reading Klein but found that the rule had not 
been violated. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441. But 
there is broad agreement among Federal Courts 
scholars that Klein must mean at least this much.9 
Whatever else, if anything, Klein may mean, its 
prohibition on directing results without amending 
the law serves critical values of judicial 
independence and integrity. 
                                            
8 Robertson also involved the exercise of delegated authority by 
a federal agency. In this context, it made sense for Congress to 
substitute its own deliberation on the environmental impact of 
logging, represented by the compromise legislation, for the 
statutory requirements that the agency consider those impact 
that formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ suit. Congress was not 
substituting its judgment for the courts’, but rather for the 
agency’s judgment within the framework of a statutory solution 
to a political controversy over the agency’s actions. That, of 
course, is not this case. 
9 See sources cited in note 2, supra. 
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At least two sets of separation of powers 
values are salient in this context. The first concerns 
the protection of litigants from an adjudication 
process dominated by majoritarian politics. When 
Congress amends the underlying law, it necessarily 
deals with the subject of legislation in a more general 
way than when it simply directs the outcome of a 
pending case. Congress may be able to foresee the 
impact of the law on the present litigation, but it 
must also contemplate that, having been amended 
generally, the law may govern other unforeseen cases 
in the future. Even in Robertson, the specific mention 
of the pending cases in the statute was merely 
illustrative; the act’s provisions nonetheless 
governed any other litigation that might arise 
concerning the affected timber sales. 
The Founders were concerned that the early 
state legislatures had too often taken judicial 
matters into their own hands.10 James Madison thus 
had this abuse, among others, in mind when he 
wrote that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”11 Our 
Constitution requires the concurrence of multiple 
institutional actors before individuals may be 
                                            
10 See Federalist No. 48, at 310-12 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(1788) (James Madison); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc. 514 U.S. 211, 221-22 (1995) (collecting sources); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960-62 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (same). 
11 Federalist No. 47, at 303 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (1788) 
(James Madison). 
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deprived of liberty or property.12 This forces 
legislators, to at least some extent, to enact laws 
behind a veil of ignorance, knowing that those laws 
may well be applied to their own constituents or 
supporters.13 And it assures individuals that when 
the law is actually applied to them, it will be in a 
judicial forum with all the procedural protections 
that such a forum affords.14 
 The second set of values involves the 
independence and integrity of the courts themselves. 
The judiciary’s power “to say what the law is,” 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803), is the power not to make law but to interpret 
and apply it according to the court’s own best 
judgment. Changing the applicable law does not 
intrude on that judgment. But telling a court what 
outcome to reach, what legal conclusions to draw, or 
how to apply the existing law to facts compromises 
the independence and integrity of the courts. Judicial 
legitimacy rests critically on the neutral application 
of general principals. Herbert Wechsler famously 
                                            
12 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) 
(“For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy 
can be implemented only by a combination of legislative 
enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation, 
no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked 
will.”). 
13 See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(explaining how the requirement that legislatures may not 
control to whom the laws will be applied prevents abuse of 
power). 
14 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting the lack of procedural safeguards when 
legislatures directly effect deprivations of rights). 
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said “the main constituent of the judicial process is 
precisely that it must be genuinely principled, 
resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite 
transcending the immediate result that is 
achieved.”15 If Congress may require a court to reach 
a particular result, without providing a neutral 
principle on which to rest that decision, then little 
would remain of Professor Wechsler’s notion. 
Moreover, this threat to judicial integrity is 
also a threat to the mechanisms of accountability 
that ordinarily discipline the democratic process. 
Congress does not have the same obligation of 
principled decisionmaking that courts do. But it 
should not be able to evade democratic responsibility 
for the choices it makes by misrepresenting those 
choices as judicial decrees. As Henry Hart explained 
over a half-century ago, 
It is one thing to exclude completely the 
federal courts from adjudication; it is 
quite another to vest the federal courts 
with jurisdiction to adjudicate but 
simultaneously restrict the power of 
those courts to perform the adjudicatory 
function in the manner they deem 
appropriate. In the former instance, by 
wholly excluding the federal courts, 
Congress loses its ability to draw upon 
the integrity possessed by the Article III 
judiciary in the public’s eyes. In 
contrast, where Congress employs the 
federal courts to implement its 
                                            
15 Herbert L. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in 
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1959). 
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deception, the harmful consequences to 
that judicial integrity are far more 
significant.16 
As Professor Hart suggested, Congress may seek to 
evade responsibility for its laws by contriving that 
they be announced as legal judgments. That 
undermines not only the integrity of the courts’ 
decisional processes but also the operation of 
democratic accountability on the legislative side.  
This Court has affirmed the institutional 
independence and integrity of the Article III courts 
in ringing terms in cases like Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995), and Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-09 (2011).  But it 
does little good to prevent Congress from reopening 
final judicial judgments or from reassigning 
decisionmaking responsibility to non-Article III 
courts if Congress may simply tell the Article III 
judiciary how to decide cases in the first place. That 
is why scholars have interpreted Klein as insisting 
that “[t]he judiciary will not permit its articulate 
authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic 
to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts 
to make it seem to support and regularize that with 
which it in fact disagrees.”17 In other words, if the 
                                            
16 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 
Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1372 (1953); see also Lawrence G. Sager, 
Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 Geo. L. J. 2525, 
2529 (1998) (arguing that Klein is directed toward preventing 
the “co-optation of the judiciary’s national authority”). 
17 Sager, supra note 16,. at 2529; see also Martin H. Redish & 
Christopher  R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of 
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political 
Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 437, 438-
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judiciary interprets the preexisting law to require an 
outcome, it may not be required to reach the opposite 
conclusion unless that preexisting law is duly 
changed. 
C. Section 8772 violates Klein’s 
principle by directing a result in 
pending litigation without 
amending the underlying law. 
 Although amici have spent years constructing 
hypotheticals to illustrate Klein’s meaning for our 
students, it is difficult to imagine a clearer violation 
than the present case. Generally speaking, the 
category of assets subject to execution in order to 
satisfy Respondents’ default judgments would be 
governed by New York law, which has adopted 
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. As 
Petitioners explain, see Petr’s Brief at 3–5, § 8-112(c) 
of the U.C.C. provides that a creditor may reach only 
those assets held by the securities intermediary 
“with whom the debtor’s securities account is 
maintained.” Creditors may not go more than one 
step, reaching assets held by another intermediary 
on behalf of the entity maintaining the debtor’s 
account.  See U.C.C. § 112 cmt. 3. Because Petitioner 
is a foreign central bank, the federal Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act provided another layer of 
protection for “property . . . of a foreign central bank 
or monetary authority held for its own account.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
 Subsequent statutes have modified the 
underlying federal protections, amending the FSIA 
                                                                                          
39 (2006) (reading Klein to forbid Congress from enlisting the 
judiciary in deceiving the electorate as to the actual state of the 
law). 
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to permit suits against foreign sovereigns for certain 
acts of terrorism, see Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 
221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241, and permitting execution 
against assets blocked by the President under certain 
economic sanctions statutes, see Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), Pub. L. No. 107-297, 
§ 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337. While these statutes had 
predictable effects on certain sorts of claims, they 
articulated general rules of decision. Moreover, they 
neither modified the rule that plaintiffs may execute 
judgments only against assets that actually belong to 
the guilty party nor provided a test for ownership 
independent of state law provisions like U.C.C. § 8-
112. 
 Section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, however, 
represents a profoundly different approach. That 
statute focused solely on particular assets against 
which Respondents sought execution in a particular 
lawsuit—identified by name and docket number in 
the statutory text—and directed that those assets 
“shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of 
execution in order to satisfy any judgment to the 
extent of any compensatory damages awarded 
against Iran.” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1). Congress stated 
that its purpose was “to ensure that Iran is held 
accountable for paying the judgments described in 
paragraph (1),” as part of “the broader goals of this 
Act to sanction Iran.” Id. § 8772(a)(2). 
 Although the line between directing a result 
and amending the underlying law may sometimes be 
fuzzy, it is not fuzzy here. Section 8772 does not 
articulate a new rule for when assets may be 
reached; it provides no new principle to replace 
17 
 
U.C.C. 8-112(c). Rather, it simply directs that the 
specific assets here “shall be subject to execution or 
attachment.” There is no general principle 
whatsoever—only a mandatory result. 
 Moreover, the breathtaking specificity of the 
statute makes clear that no new law has been made. 
The law does not apply to a general class of assets, 
but rather only to “the financial assets that are 
identified in and the subject of proceedings in the 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) 
(GWG).” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b); see also § 8772(c)(2) 
(providing that “[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed . . . to apply to assets other than the assets 
described in subsection (b)”). Subsection (c) clarifies, 
moreover, that the statute does not “affect the 
availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a 
judgment in any other action against a terrorist 
party in any proceedings other than proceedings 
referred to in subsection (b).” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1). 
The statute is truly a ticket for this day and train 
only. If other terrorism plaintiffs seeking to execute 
identical default judgments filed an identical 
lawsuit, they would not get the benefit of § 8772.18  
Nor does the statute govern similarly situated 
claimants in any other context. If this statute is 
taken to amend the underlying law, then there is 
truly no distinction between so doing and directing 
the result in a pending case.  
                                            
18 If the district court were to dismiss this action without 
prejudice on the basis of some technical defect in the complaint, 
it is not even clear that § 8772 would apply to Respondents after 
they re-filed their lawsuit. 
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It makes no difference that the statute leaves 
two determinations for the district court to make. 
Section 8772(a)(2) requires two judicial findings as a 
predicate to execution or attachment: “the court shall 
determine whether Iran holds equitable title to, or 
the beneficial interest in, the assets described in 
subsection (b) and that no other person possesses a 
constitutionally protected interest in the assets 
described in subsection (b) under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(2). Neither of these 
preconditions in this case is in dispute here—nor, of 
course, is the statute even applicable to any other 
circumstances in which they might be in dispute.  
But in any event a Klein violation does not 
require that Congress direct every finding in the 
case.19 Congress could not save a statute directing a 
particular result in a pending case simply by 
requiring the court to first find that it had personal 
jurisdiction of the dispute. Nor could Congress 
require a court to find the defendant liable then 
leave it to determine damages, or direct it to certify a 
particular class action, or even require the court to 
find against the defendant with respect to a 
particular defense. The offense against judicial 
independence occurs when Congress requires a court 
to resolve a particular issue in accord with 
Congress’s wishes, rather than the court’s own best 
view of the underlying law and facts. Klein does not 
ask for some sort of on-balance judgment as to 
                                            
19 The statute in Klein itself required at least a preliminary 
finding that the claimant’s case rested on a pardon, rather than 
on other proof of loyalty. 
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whether the court has been left with anything 
meaningful to do. 
 We do not deny that it is often difficult to draw 
a clear line between legislative directions to decide a 
pending case in a particular way under the existing 
law and amendments to the underlying law that 
effectively resolve pending cases. And in the close 
cases, this Court and the lower courts have generally 
deferred to Congress, interpreting the acts in 
question as legitimate examples of the latter 
phenomenon rather than unconstitutional instances 
of the former. That is all to the good. But Klein’s 
principle—narrow as it is—has stood as an 
affirmance of the courts’ fundamental independence 
and a deterrent to legislation that treads close to the 
line. It is no coincidence that Congress rarely 
legislates in ways that even arguably direct a 
decision in pending cases. But if this Court, by 
upholding § 8772, tells Congress that it can tell the 
courts how to decide cases, then Congress is likely to 
tell the courts how to decide cases more often. 
II. Section 8772 invades the province of the 
courts by purporting to legislate with 
respect to a single case. 
 Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Fletcher v. 
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), that “[i]t is the 
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe 
general rules for the government of society; the 
application of those rules would seem to be the duty 
of other departments.” Id. at 136. This principle—
that legislation may invade the judicial province 
when it lacks a general character—is distinct from 
the problem in Klein. That case, after all, involved a 
general directive to resolve all claims for restoration 
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of property predicated on a presidential pardon in 
accord with Congress’s view that pardons were proof 
of disloyalty, contrary to the Court’s prior decision in 
Padelford. The statute potentially governed a 
number of different suits by different claimants. 
Here, however, Congress has singled out a single 
case for its mandate. Our contention is that even if 
one views § 8772 as having modified the underlying 
law with respect to execution on assets held by 
intermediaries, the fact that the statute does so only 
with respect to these assets and these parties, and 
only in this case, is sufficient to doom the law. 
A. Congress ordinarily may not 
legislate with respect to a single 
case. 
Petitioners have collected ample historical 
evidence that Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding 
of the critical distinction between the legislative and 
judicial functions was widely shared by the founding 
generation and consistently followed throughout our 
history. Petr’s Brief at 22–25, 29–35. The clearest 
example of this understanding in the constitutional 
text is the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 3, which prohibits “trial by legislature.” 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). 
That Clause, of course, addressed a specific set of 
historical abuses under English and early American 
practice, and this Court’s cases have confined its 
ambit to legislative “punishment.” Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 
(1977).  But the Court has also made clear that the 
Bill of Attainder Clause does not exhaust the 
requirement of legislative generality.  As this Court 
said in Brown, “the Bill of Attainder Clause not only 
was intended as one implementation of the general 
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principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected 
the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not 
so well suited as politically independent judges and 
juries to the task of ruling upon the 
blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate 
punishment upon, specific persons.” Brown, 381 U.S. 
at 445.20 
These concerns about legislative trials are no 
less salient when Congress acts to disadvantage 
particular persons in particular cases, even when 
those disadvantages do not qualify as “punishment” 
for attainder purposes. The legislative process is 
designed primarily to identify and vindicate the 
majority will, not provide due process for the 
minority.21 As Justice Powell pointed out in INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), “[t]he Framers were 
well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the 
determination of the rights of one person to the 
“tyranny of shifting majorities.” Id. at 961 (Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment). He concluded that “trial 
by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to 
prevent the abuse of power.” Id. at 962. 
                                            
20 See also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 241-43 
(1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that 
the principle of legislative generality is expressed both in the 
Bill of Attainder Clause and “in the Constitution’s ‘general 
allocation of power’”) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
21 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Unlike the judiciary or an 
administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established 
substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, 
such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial 
tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency 
adjudicates individual rights.”). 
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This requirement of legislative generality is 
our primary safeguard against any number of 
oppressive legislative actions, and it is reflected in a 
number of other constitutional provisions. As Justice 
Scalia has explained  
What assures us that those limits [of 
humane treatment] will not be exceeded 
is the same constitutional guarantee 
that is the source of most of our 
protection-what protects us, for 
example, from being assessed a tax of 
100% of our income above the 
subsistence level, from being forbidden 
to drive cars, or from being required to 
send our children to school for 10 hours 
a day, none of which horribles are 
categorically prohibited by the 
Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal 
Protection Clause, which requires the 
democratic majority to accept for 
themselves and their loved ones what 
they impose on you and me.22 
These safeguards are defeated if Congress may 
single out highly-specific applications for its laws.  
 The form of § 8772, which mandates relief in a 
single case for specific plaintiffs for claims brought 
under generally applicable principles of tort, raises a 
further problem. If Congress may specify special 
relief in particular cases, or set aside generally 
applicable defenses or limitations on remedies for 
particular litigation, then it may undermine the 
                                            
22 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also 
Araiza, supra note 2, at 1089-1106 (discussing various 
constitutional requirements of generality). 
23 
 
generality even of laws phrased in general terms. No 
one would dispute that the laws prescribing liability 
for terrorist atrocities or the general prohibition on 
reaching assets through multiple financial 
intermediaries are general laws. But if Congress is 
permitted to amend those laws to exempt only 
particular persons in particular cases, then it can 
destroy the initial evenhandedness of those 
enactments. One may doubt, for example, whether 
Congress will pierce the protections of foreign central 
banks not directly holding assets in the United 
States as they pertain to countries with whom the 
United States is on good terms. No law is general if 
Congress may pick and choose when litigation under 
it will succeed and when it will fail. 
This Court’s decision in Nixon did reject a 
claim that any legislation directed at a single person 
is necessarily unconstitutional, denying that the 
Clause “limit[s] Congress to the choice of legislating 
for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not 
legislating at all.” 433 U.S. at 471. As Petitioner 
rightly points out, the law at issue in Nixon applied 
to a wide range of potential cases concerning 
President Nixon’s papers, not just a single litigation. 
Moreover, Nixon was an extraordinary case in which 
the subject of the legislation “constituted a legitimate 
class of one.” Id. at 472. Decisions by the courts of 
appeals have likewise recognized that sometimes 
Congress may legislate with respect to a legitimately 
unique problem (although these cases typically 
govern more than one potential case). In National 
Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092 
(D.C. Cir. 2001), for example, the D.C. Circuit found 
that legislation specific to the World War II 
memorial on the National Mall was legitimately 
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confined to “a unique public amenity.” Id. at 1097. 
What is required is some account of why the 
legislation is so confined. Courts may accord 
substantial deference to such accounts while still 
requiring that they be either articulated or inferable 
from the circumstances.  
There are, of course, other sorts of instances in 
which Congress acts in a way directed at particular 
individuals or entities or even at particular 
litigation. Since the beginning of the Republic, for 
example, Congress has enacted “private bills” that 
may pay a judgment against the United States, 
waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, or 
release the Government’s own claims. But these 
circumstances are quite different from legislation 
aimed at resolving a single case. First, all of them 
involve the exercise of either Congress’s Article IV 
power to “dispose” of government property or its 
general implicit authority to regulate the United 
States’ own conduct in litigation—neither of which is 
a general legislative power and may be subject to less 
stringent requirements of generality.23 Second, as 
Petitioners point out, these sorts of private bills 
typically involve public rights over which Congress 
typically has broad discretion, see Petr’s Brief at 41; 
we are unaware of any private bills altering the 
outcome of litigation between private parties. Third, 
many private bills operate to facilitate litigation—not 
to direct its outcome. Bills to pay judgments operate 
to permit recovery after litigation has ended; waivers 
of government claims will typically occur prior to its 
                                            
23 It is worth noting that both Nixon and National Coalition to 
Save Our Mall likewise involved the disposition of government 
property. 
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commencement; and neither undermines the rights 
of private litigants. Finally, private bills to pay 
judgments (and arguably bills to waive sovereign 
immunity) are enacted in service of another 
constitutional mandate, which is that public 
expenditures must be pursuant to “Appropriations 
made by Law,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. That 
principle surely permits, and sometimes requires, a 
greater degree of specificity than regulatory 
legislation specifying the rights and duties of private 
actors. 
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 
U.S. 429 (1992), this Court declined to consider a 
legislative generality challenge to a federal statute 
on the ground that it had not been properly 
presented to the court of appeals and not advanced 
by a party in the Supreme Court. See id. at 441. 
Even if the Court had reached the question, the 
statute in Robertson applied by its terms to a 
significant swath of important federal lands over a 
significant period of time, and it governed all 
controversies pertaining to timber sales on those 
lands and in that time period. Moreover, the limited 
scope of the timber compromise was determined, in 
significant part, by the limited habitat of the 
northern spotted owl. The present litigation presents 
a much clearer case. 
B. Section 8772 violates the principle 
of legislative generality. 
This case squarely presents the question that 
the Court reserved in Robertson. As § 8772(b) makes 
clear, the Act applies only to “the financial assets 
that are identified in and the subject of proceedings 
in the United States District Court for the Southern 
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District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) 
(GWG).” Section 8772(c) then clarifies that the Act 
does not “affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a 
right to satisfy a judgment in any other action 
against a terrorist party in any proceedings other 
than proceedings referred to in subsection (b).” The 
act is not simply a general rule that is intended to 
influence a pending case; rather, it only applies to a 
single pending case. Even if other cases are 
indistinguishable in terms of their facts or the legal 
claims at issue, § 8772 cannot apply.  
This case illustrates the wisdom of the 
Framers’ insistence on legislative generality. 
Petitioner—the national bank of a nation that has 
branded America “the Great Satan” and carried out 
any number of reprehensible acts against its 
citizens—is hardly popular in Congress; it is 
eminently understandable why Congress might wish 
to impose unique disadvantages upon it. And 
Respondents here, the victims of tragic injuries, are 
highly sympathetic; compensating them is a laudable 
public purpose. But in a nation that treasures its 
commitment to the rule of law, the dispute here must 
be resolved according to neutral principles. If 
Congress were simply to take resources from the 
Bank in order to compensate Respondents, for 
example, it would be obliged to pay compensation. 
See U.S. Const. amdt. V.24 Having elected instead to 
let Respondents seek compensation through private 
                                            
24 See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1071-72 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that 
Takings law has “frequently looked to the generality of a 
regulation of property”) (emphasis in original); accord Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987). 
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litigation, Congress may not effectively render its 
own verdict by specifying a rule to govern only this 
single case. 
It is true, of course, that legislatures 
constantly draw distinctions and classifications 
among persons subject to the law. And when they do 
so, they need not always adopt a general principle 
and follow it to its logical conclusion; rather, “the 
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself 
to the phase of the problem which seems most acute 
to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Even then, 
of course, the classification must be rational and non-
arbitrary. Id. at 488. But where the legislative 
classification confines the law’s effect to a single case, 
pending in the federal courts, additional concerns of 
separation of powers come into play. In that area, 
this Court has insisted upon “prophylactic” rules, 
“establishing high walls and clear distinctions 
because low walls and vague distinctions will not be 
judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch 
conflict.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211, 239 (1995).25  
A law confined to a single pending case is a 
legislative trial, and therefore unconstitutional. 
                                            
25 Plaut doubted “[t]he premise that there is something wrong 
with particularized legislative action.” 514 U.S. at 239 n.9. But 
the law in Plaut affected many different cases, not just one, see 
id. at 227, and therefore did not raise the spectre of Congress 
actually appropriating the judicial function to itself. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit should be reversed. 
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